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ABSTRACT
The notion that something that cannot be measured does not exist seems to apply to 
the absence of consideration of culture in economics, where the role of institutions is at 
the center of the link between the two. Yet, economic prosperity, crisis, and deprivation 
result from human behavior, reflecting the outcome of social learning—a central 
concept of culture. Institutions and culture interact and evolve in complementary 
ways. Each can affect the process of exchange and transaction costs, which in turn 
determine economic performance. Although more work has been done to better 
understand the interrelation between economics and culture, most falls on deaf ears 
among mainstream economists, despite the fact that real-world cases show the critical 
role of this interrelation. This paper discusses demonstrates a deficiency of mainstream 
economics in its disregard of the role of culture and institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 “If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture 
makes all the difference.” — (David Landes (1998), “Max Weber was right on”)
Following the tradition of the marginalist school, abstraction in economics received 
a big push during the late 19th century, led by Stanley Jevons and Auguste Walras. 
This occurred despite Adam Smith’s strong belief in the significance of culture 
and Robert Malthus’ deep sense that culture affects the dynamics of population. 
David Ricardo was most instrumental in reducing economics to a culture-free 
abstraction. Alfred Marshall, at least judging from his early work, was another 
proponent of this view, although his subsequent “Industry and Trade” shows an 
increased awareness toward the complex cultural reality behind the abstraction of 
supply and demand, with a strong institutional flavor in the analysis.
This is rather puzzling because the core of economics is actually exchange, and 
the terms that permit an exchange are called the terms of trade, that is, the ratio 
of the price producers are willing to receive and consumers are willing to pay for 
the exchange. Indeed, while exchange is a fundamental part of economic behavior, 
perhaps with the exception of game theory and transaction cost theory, remarkably 
little attention is given to analysis of processes of exchange in the economics 
literature. Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010) argue that the item exchanged, the 
actors engaged in the decisions, and the physical, social, technological, and legal 
environment within which the actors operate, matter in understanding transactions 
and outcomes. The combination of those elements, the formation process of the 
exchange, and the resulting transaction are considered an exchange configuration.
Mainstream economists contend that when there is a divergence between the 
equilibrium price and the actual price at which the exchange takes place, either 
excess demand or excess supply will be eliminated by price changes. But the actual 
process of adjustment in the exchange is not satisfactorily explained, despite the 
fact that, in reality, the whole process captures the satisfaction of those who trade. 
Such satisfaction is a complex subject, but is necessarily an integral part of any set 
of cultural relations involving trust, regret, deception, persuasion, and learning 
processes.
The difficulty of identifying the relation and causality among culture, 
institutions and economic performance has led to some work in this area. Becker and 
Murphy (2001); Akerlof and Kranton (2010); Streeten (2006); Bénabou and Tirole 
(2006); and the classic North (1990) on institutional economics are among the most 
influential in this area. More narrowly focused and applied work is also prevalent. 
Ang (2018), is one of many examples that tries to quantify the relationship between 
culture (individualism) and economic development (technological innovation), 
presumably through individual beliefs about the importance of innovation and 
creativity. Nevertheless, most work on cultural economics continues to fall on deaf 
ears among mainstream economists.
This paper discusses a deficiency of mainstream economics in that it overlooks 
the role of culture and institutions, which should be an integral part of economics.
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II. MAINSTREAM AND CULTURAL ECONOMICS
Despite their arguments that clearly foreshadow cultural economics, it is unclear 
why institutionalists like Thorstein Veblen (in the US) and Max Weber (in Europe) 
failed to influence the mainstream of economics during the time. Indeed, one of 
the critical questions in cultural economics is about the extent to which a particular 
system of institutions that produce changes in culture will survive or fail precisely 
because of such changes. Theoretically, it is the institutional system of legitimacy 
that will survive and dominate, not the dynamics of power and wealth; without 
legitimacy neither power nor wealth can be preserved.
This is particularly clear in monetary economics, where the use of formalistic 
mechanical models is prerequisite and there is an almost complete lack of interest 
in the cultural aspects within which the institutions of money and banking actually 
operate. The models are filled with statistics and correlation (often confused with 
causation) with little attempt to examine the actual processes involved. This is 
irrespective of the fact that one cannot truly understand what is going on in the 
banking sector unless we treat bankers as human beings and try to understand 
how they really think. The same applies to players in the capital markets.
The move from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium in economics is 
another example of neglect of the cultural dimension. While the overall quantities 
produced and consumed are (correctly) not taken as resulting from individual 
producer and consumer decisions (but rather the result of the interactions of such 
decisions), it is often assumed in the corresponding model that the choices of a 
“representative” utilitymaximizing individual coincide with the aggregate choices. 
The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, a poster child of 
central bank’s tool for policy analysis, is a noted example. The heterogeneity of 
agents’ behavior and culture is considered irrelevant. This is not only unjustified 
but also ill-suited for a serious policy making that deals with problems involving 
coordination failures such as unemployment, under-utilization, inequality, 
financial instability, and bankruptcy.
For most mainstream economists, when complexity increases and 
interdependence grows, new variables, parameters and equations are added 
and non-linearity is introduced, with the expectation that the model’s predictive 
power will strengthen. Little effort is made to delve into the changing patterns of 
behavior as part of possible mutations in the social system, where the process of 
selection may involve increased vulnerabilities, bankruptcies, crisis, or simply a 
loss of legitimacy.
Even in taxation, a system that emerges from the interaction of different 
governmental subcultures, and where the tax system itself is the result of a long 
historical process involving the changing culture of governments, and members 
of parliament and their constituents, the efficiency of “one-way transfer” depends 
not only on the perception of threat (legal sanctions for failure to pay tax), but also 
the culture of tax collectors. The great mass of individuals paying taxes with a fair 
degree of fidelity is itself clearly a cultural phenomenon. Yet, most research on tax 
issues tends to be exclusively financial and economics-based, void of any cultural 
context.
In a more micro and industrial organization subject, research works have 
actually come very close to directly connecting culture and economic concepts, 
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although these are more of the business schools’ domain, e.g., marketing, industrial 
organization, and labor economics, where there is a long tradition of studying such 
areas as collective bargaining, labor unions, culture of firm and factory. However, 
even in these fields, mechanistic approaches have encroached on the analysis to 
the point where no collaborative work with sociologists.
Yet, in supply–demand theory, for example, when excess supply occurs, 
producers may alter their preference by avoiding efficiency efforts, and consumers 
may not follow the standard law of supply–demand, as they may not increase their 
consumption despite the downward pressure on price. In such circumstances, 
preferences should not be taken as the only determinant of an economic process as 
in a standard optimization model; rather, it should be learned during the process 
of cultural transformation. Thus, the culture-affected learning process could 
generate outcomes different from a standard solution.
The emphasis on learning is the crucial difference between mechanistic 
economics and cultural economics, implying that cultural economics is 
evolutionary in nature. Learning is part of social evolution, which is more complex 
than biological evolution. It occurs more slowly because people, let alone societies, 
are not willing to change easily, due to their realistic appraisal of the uncertainties 
arising from such change, which is a standard problem in economic development.
In contrast, mechanistic economics relies on its predictive power based on 
the derived parameters (assumed stable) of difference or differential equations. 
This contradicts the fact that in any dynamic process, when strain increases, the 
parameters in the system change. More importantly, the implied adjustment may 
create further strain in the same part or in other parts of the system. If a crisis 
eventually occurs, the absence of stability (order) with constant parameters may 
not tell us much about the stability that is absent. Even if no adjustment is taking 
place, something important about the social system may have been generated 
by the absence of such adjustment. That is, what does not happen can be more 
interesting than what does happen.
III. CAUSALITY
As in any relation between two components, culture and economics, the third, 
fourth and other components may have some role as intermediate variables. This 
applies to the link between culture and economic performance as well. There is 
also the common problem of direction of causality.
On the first issue, at the outset, it is necessary to define culture and economic 
performance. Various narratives for culture have been proposed, from which the 
following elements are relevant: customary beliefs and values, preferences, long 
duration of consistency in cultural traits and groups—whether social, ethnic or 
religious. The relevant elements in economic performance are level and growth of 
output or income, savings, and income distribution. In some cases, the probability 
of something positive emerging is also used, such as having a greater number of 
entrepreneurs.
Intermediate components relevant to identifying the link between culture and 
economic performance include prior beliefs, religion, ethnicity, preferences, and 
trust. Individually, these components may not have an independent role, but they 
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can function as a coordinating device to make societies play the same “game” in 
the face of different conditions and focal points.
The importance of prior beliefs cannot be overstated, as many decisions (and 
thus the corresponding outcome and performance) are based on such priors (e.g., 
which technology to use, what measures to adopt to mitigate the effects of climate 
change, how to deal with different economic shocks, what strategy to adopt to cope 
with an aging population). Here, culture plays a major role in forming individual 
beliefs, even in new environments and across generations. Thus, prior beliefs 
can be an important channel of cultural influence on economic performance. Yet, 
economists generally do not have much to say about such priors. They typically 
assume that individuals have common priors.
Trust is an important component arising from priors. Many even believe that it 
is through the concept of trust that culture enters the economic discourse. Research 
demonstrates the contribution of the level of trust in a community to economic 
performance (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Zak and Knack, 2001), 
although most such research does not elaborate the mechanism through which 
measured trust is positively correlated with economic performance. What remains 
debatable is whether trust is an inherited cultural variable or is developed through 
adoption of a proper legal system. Some also argue that trust is the outcome of 
individual or societal interactions.
The significance of trust in economics is made clear by Arrow (1972): “Virtually 
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any 
transaction conducted over a period of time.” International trade is an example 
of an area where trust is quite important. But it was the seminal work of Putnam 
(1993, 2000) that put trust at the center of the discussion by considering it as a form 
of social capital capturing the value and relationships of resources, where social 
networks play a central role in the production of public and common good. The 
constituent elements of social capital, over which people have more control than 
over culture, are trust, norms, and networks.
In the current era of information technology, priors including trust can be 
influenced or enhanced by the availability of information (e.g., “big data” and 
“internet of things”). Examples of online trade and transactions abound where 
reviews and reputation may alter the beliefs of people or customers. Even in 
political elections, the use of “big data” combined with complex algorithms has 
become widespread, and it has proven fairly effective.
The problems with causality are no less critical than the problems of definition. 
The first problem is the difficulty in separating culturally based beliefs from 
rational expectations. Whether trust is culturally driven or rational-prior driven by 
environment with a prevailing degree of trustworthiness is not easy to determine. 
It is generally the case that the idiosyncratic component of trust tends to increase 
when societies share the same cultural trait (e.g., religion), and decreases with 
genetic distance in terms of ancient cultural aspects. Level of education also 
matters: the role of inherited cultural aspects in the formation of priors tends to 
diminish as society becomes more educated (reduced dependence of trust on 
cultural variables).
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Even if cultural variables and measures of economic performance are highly 
correlated, one does not necessarily causes the other. Two events occurring 
simultaneously does not imply causality.
Another serious conundrum is with regard to the direction of causality, or 
what econometricians label the endogeneity problem: “which affects which.” The 
debate about whether culture affects economics or vice versa has a long history. 
Some propose that technology determines the type of social structure and dominant 
culture. In supporting the argument that the steam-mill produces capitalism, Karl 
Marx (1859) held this view. In contrast, Max Weber (1905) and Polanyi et al. (1957) 
held the opposite line of thinking. To the extent that cultural aspects like religion 
are considered important to the establishment of markets as well as in moderating 
market excesses, these authors argue that culture—in this case religion—played 
a critical role in the development of capitalism. Their explanations are powerful, 
and the examples provided are quite persuasive; yet, they fell on deaf ears among 
mainstream economists.
As expected, each camp attempted to have their idea vindicated. Economists 
of the Chicago School tried hard to endogenize beliefs and preferences (Lucas, 
1976; Stigler and Becker, 1977). Some went further by showing that religious 
and social norms are the result of a group-level optimization. Others extended 
the theory of human capital by emphasizing investment in social skills and 
social interactions. Those who were more econometrically inclined emphasized 
the use of proper econometric techniques to identify the direction of causality, 
among others by employing a set of intermediate variables as the “instrumental 
variables,” or by examining historical exogenous shocks in their models. But the 
presence of complementarities between culture and economic performance often 
hinders identification.
While differences between the two camps may never been reconciled, active 
debate on the link between culture and economics continues. Most of this debate 
emphasizes the interaction between culture and institutions.
IV. ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS
Institutions are meant to facilitate human interaction by maintaining patterns that 
regulate societal behavior (North, 1990; Azis, 2000, 2008). These are the “rules of the 
game in a society” by promoting certain behaviors and prohibiting others. There 
are formal institutions (e.g., bank regulation, tax system, accounting rules) and 
informal institutions (e.g., codes of conduct, habits, traditions, norms).1 While most 
analyses focus on the former, the latter can be more important in understanding 
the role of institutions in shaping economic performance. Enforcement is another 
critical component of institutions. Even well-established rules and regulations 
can be rendered ineffective if enforcement is weak. Two systems with similar 
institutions may produce different economic performance because of differing 
enforcement.
1  An organization, defined as a group of individuals bound together to achieve some objective, is also 
part of institutions. An organization like government can influence otherinstitutions through which 
economic performance is shape
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2 In this context, transaction costs can be alternatively defined as the costs of transacting activity, which 
includes defining, protecting and enforcing property rights to goods. It takes resources to measure 
the attributes of goods and additional resources to define and measure rights that are transferred (in 
an exchange). Such costs are uncharacteristically high because one party knows neither the complete 
attributes of goods and services nor the characteristics of the agent and the other party.
To the extent formal and informal institutions are shaped by ideas and 
ideologies, not created in a vacuum, culture enters the equation. Through culturally 
affected ideas, individuals use their subjective mental constructs to interpret the 
world around them and make choices. Arguably, institutions determine the extent 
to which ideas and ideologies, and hence culture, are important.
Informal institutions come from “socially transmitted information” and are 
part of a heritage or culture. In the case of formal institutions, they are also linked 
with the prevailing political system. For example, in federalist systems, markets are 
fostered through competition for economic organizations at the sub-national level. 
In other systems, room for pleasing powerful interest groups may be more ample. 
The resulting economic performance under different systems (hence different 
institutional arrangements) is likely dissimilar. In this respect, the resulting 
economic performance can be associated with the efficiency of the outcome.
Contrary to neo-clastsical economic theory, negotiations required to reach 
an efficient outcome are not costless. For example, there are costs for learning 
(by consumers) about the quality—and eventually the price—of goods to be 
exchanged. It may take some time before the actual exchange occurs. There can be 
also a bargaining process as part of negotiations. This also entails costs.
The problem of information asymmetry can cause observed costs to deviate 
from the true costs, making them more difficult to measure. Even if both parties 
are honest, there is always something with respect to enforcing the agreement that 
still needs to be specified, either implicitly or explicitly. This is also not costless. 
When a dispute arises and a settlement (requiring lawyers) is needed, the costs can 
further multiply.
All the above costs are known as transaction costs; they are usually high and 
not always reported (not internalized), especially in developing countries. In 
some cases, personalized transactions are still the rule rather than exception. High 
transaction costs lead to unfavorable economic performance. Since only at zero 
transaction costs can an efficient outcome prevail --the well-known Coase (1960) 
theorem, attempts to lower transaction costs are preferred. The most common 
method is through establishing clear property rights (also often deficient in many 
developing countries) to facilitate the smooth functioning of markets.2
High transaction costs can also be linked to the size of the unproductive informal 
sector. Small business operations and poor individuals, including poor migrants, 
are “forced” to remain small and informal. Transaction costs to enter the formal 
sector are too high (e.g., obtaining permits, which may require paying bribes and 
be very time-consuming). Unsecured assets and a lack of formal documents also 
diminish incentives to expand, and bank credit is difficult to obtain under such 
circumstances. Thus, informality persists. So do inefficiency and low productivity.
In a dynamic context, an institutional framework ensuring that technology can 
advance (‘creative destruction’) is also frequently absent in developing countries. 
Free-entry and free-exit hardly prevail. Firms with privileged access to those in 
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power survive by patronage through monopoly rights, soft budgets, or special 
concessions. For them, no innovation is needed to survive. More seriously, they 
resent any policy measures intended to enable innovation to raise productivity 
when such measures threaten their survival. Power and influence enable them to 
keep away potential competitors.
In short, culture-influenced institutions can affect transaction costs, and in turn 
economic performance, in a static and dynamic sense. The latter works through 
organizations’ decisions about technology and innovation.
Note that one cannot claim a superiority of direction of causality between 
institutions and culture, because the two interact and evolve in a complementary 
way. The relation also involves mutual feedback effects: depending on the type 
of institutions, culture may evolve in differing ways, and different cultures may 
cause institutions to function differently.
In this context, a more relevant economic performance measure is productivity. 
While it is less directly observable compared to standard variables like output 
and income, productivity involves attributes highly relevant to cultural traits and 
cultural capital, particularly social capital.
In prosperous communities, Putnam (1993) argues that social capital is like 
“physical capital and human capital-tools and training that enhance individual 
productivity.” This author goes on to state that social capital refers to “features of 
social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit.” This description is unarguably loaded with 
important implications.
By giving it the “same status” as other traditional inputs (capital and labor), 
social capital contributes to productivity through a production–function setting 
used extensively by economists. It also highlights the significance of individuals’ 
“participation,” which will form the group’s ability to work jointly through 
“collaborative effort,” as capital. Failure to do so will result in disappointing 
“productivity performance.” Absent trust-based relations, the system tends 
to focus on “short-term self-interest” and individual transactions, eliminating 
the potential and opportunity for accumulation and “innovation” processes as 
in standard capital theory. While networks of institutions are important, their 
presence in no way assures collaboration when “commitment and coordination” is 
limited. This translates into obstacles for many developing and emerging markets, 
where weak capacity, including the state’s capacity to effect “coalition building” 
needed for “institutional upgrading” to support innovation must face a “growing 
and diverse power of influence among social groups and business communities.”
All the above requisites and conditions (designated with quotation marks) 
reflect institutional quality and social capital, which, through implied transaction 
costs, determine the extent to which a country is able to sustain productivity 
growth to improve society’s welfare.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Culture and economics are closely linked. Yet, economists have long been reluctant 
to study the interrelation between them. This is partly because a testable hypothesis 
with measured data that can be proven or disproven is hard to construct, let alone 
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the difficulty in defining the term “culture.” This is unfortunate, as it reflects the 
notion that something that cannot be measured does not exist. The reality is: 
attempts to alter the incentive system through a policy may not on its own be 
enough to improve the economic performance when the process is incompatible 
with the prevailing cultural and institutional factors.
Faced with the reality of more complex relations and growing interdependence, 
mainstream economists opt for adding new variables, parameters, and equations. 
When pressed further, they introduce non-linearity into their models. Little effort is 
made to delve into behavior that reflects the outcome of social learning—a central 
concept of culture—where a set of cultural relations involving a learning process 
as part of social evolution, which is more complex than biological evolution, is 
important. The emphasis on learning implies that, unlike mechanistic economics, 
cultural economics is evolutionary in nature.
The role of institutions lies at the center of the link between culture and 
economics, particularly in the direction of causality. Institutions and culture 
interact and evolve in a complementary way, not through a one-way causality. 
Culture-influenced institutions can affect transaction costs, and in turn, economic 
performance. In a dynamic setting, through organizations’ decisions about 
technology and innovation, a set of requisites reflecting institutional quality and 
social capital has an important role in influencing productivity growth and hence 
societal welfare. One such requisite is individual participation, which will form 
the basis of the group’s ability to work jointly through collaborative effort. The 
required trust relation is in sharp contrast with short-term, self-interest driven 
transactions.
Although more work has been carried out to better understand the interrelation 
between economics and culture, albeit deficient of the precise mechanism how the 
interrelation really works, most such work falls on deaf ears among mainstream 
economists. Abstract culturalism and economic determinism should neither be 
separated nor contrasted. It is mind-boggling how economics can be reduced to 
a culture- and institution-free abstraction when there is abundant evidence from 
real-world cases that shows otherwise.
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